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Franchisors’ disclosure duty: market transparency and franchisee protection 
Abstract 
The franchisee is usually the most vulnerable part of the franchise relationship, and 
should therefore receive greater protection from the legal framework. In this regard, the 
franchisor’s pre-contractual disclosure duty has evolved in its legal status. Whereas its 
original purpose was to ensure transparency in the market, it now serves to protect the 
franchisee. In this paper, we compare the franchisor’s obligations established by the legal 
framework in Spain with those set out in the Model Law drawn up by The International 
Institute for the Unification of Private Law. 
Introduction 
The legal status of franchises and franchise networks has undergone significant changes 
over the last decade. In a globalised economy, and in the face of a profound financial 
crisis, this type of business network offers an attractive option for budding traders to enter 
the market (Di Paolo & Grassivaro, 2007). According to data published in 2012, Spain is 
a prime example of the aforementioned situation, with steady growth since 2007 in the 
number of franchise networks operating in the Spanish economy (Tormo & Asociados, 
2012). In this sense, legislators have tried to endow this type of contract with legal 
coverage since franchising began to expand (Chaudey & Fadairo, 2010).  
With 63 member statesi, UNIDROIT (The International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law) is an independent intergovernmental Organisation whose purpose is to study 
the needs and means of modernising, harmonising and coordinating private and, in 
particular, commercial law between countries and groups of countries, and to formulate 
uniform legal instruments, principles and rules to achieve these objectives. UNIDROIT is 
particularly worthy of mention because, among other instruments, this organisation drew 
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up the Model Law of 25 September 2002 on franchises, which has been adapted by its 
members, and may also act as a reference framework to complement the specific 
legislation in force in the other countries that adhere to its guidelines. 
One of the aspects that causing a good deal of conflict in terms of franchises in Spain 
relates to the franchisor’s duty to provide pre-contractual information to the franchisee. 
This high degree of conflict should be considered alongside the evolution of its legal 
interpretation and conceptualisation, which in recent times, has gone from a need for 
market transparency (disclosure) to an imperative ruling governing the protection of the 
franchisee, as the most vulnerable party of the legal relationship (Kaufmann & 
Oppenheim, 2007). 
All of this is directly related to the consequences of failing to disclose pre-contractual 
information, which grants the franchisee the right to end the contract (through annulment, 
cancellation, or termination). These reasons go a long way to explaining the plethora of 
regulations relating to this specific issue in different legal contexts (UNIDROIT, State 
Law, or Draft Common Frame of Reference) over the last decade, and to explaining our 
motivation for studying this topic.  
Despite the practical and legal importance of this issue, however, the legal answers to the 
question vary enormously depending on the context. Consequently, some agents address 
this issue, for example the Model Law of UNIDROIT, while others, such as the Spanish 
legislature in the most recent legal reform of 2010, maintain legislation that was perhaps 
pioneering in its day. This is in contrast with recent reforms put in place over the last 
seven years in this field by various legal systems that regulate franchisee protection by 
enforcing the franchisor’s duty to disclose pre-contractual information (e.g., Belgium, 
USA, Italy, China, and Mexico). 
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Furthermore, an improvement in the legal framework has the benefit of reducing 
contractual and transaction costs (Williamson, 1985; Shane, 2001; Vazquez, 2008; Peris-
Ortiz, 2011; Grewall et al., 2011; Perryman and Combs, 2012; Rondan-Cataluña et al., 
2012), creating benefits for the outsourcing of activities and for franchisees.  
Franchisors’ duty of pre-contractual disclosure 
Negotiations prior to signing a contract are considered to be the run-up to legal trading 
and are governed by the principle of good faith. This implies that such actions should 
comply with a model of honest behaviour based on loyalty and cooperation with a view 
to giving start-up firms a sound start. As a result, this principle is not only limited to 
preventing certain malicious or detrimental actions against the contract’s counterpart or 
the legal relationship (Gómez Calle, 1994). 
Good business faith includes the duty to disclose pre-contractual information, which 
consists of communicating the necessary data, circumstances, and elements for 
assessment. The need for good business faith is twofold. First, for forming contract 
criteria; that is, in legal terms, forming the contractual agreement under full awareness of 
the contract’s conditions. Second, as a requirement for market transparency and 
competency (disclosure); in other words, the correct functioning of the market to exploit 
economic resources adequately.  
These needs are fundamentally based on two motives: information asymmetry (De Poli, 
2002) and an imbalance in contractual relations. These are elements that are felt 
particularly strongly in business networks involving a network leader and other members, 
as is the case with franchise contracts and franchise networks. Indeed, the prominence of 
franchise chains or networks is a reality in the Spanish market. 
The franchisor and, to an even greater extent, the master franchise maintain a legally 
strong position and are in possession of all of the business information, while the future 
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franchisee is in a weaker legal situation and lacks information on the firm when 
negotiating the franchise contract. Nevertheless, the transfer of know-how is a defining 
element of franchise contracts, and the diffusion of this know-how might well be harmful 
to the economic interest of the business or even to the franchise network. This situation 
therefore demands a reasonable balance in the exchange of information, so that the 
franchisee has sufficient knowledge to sign the contract without endangering the 
franchise’s interests. Nevertheless, the outcome that the potential franchisee, once armed 
with the business information, may withdraw from the negotiations and legitimately 
decline to sign the franchise contract or join the network should be borne in mind. In this 
sense, the timing of the documents containing pre-contractual information prior to 
signing the contract is regarded as a particularly delicate matter during the negotiation of 
franchise contracts, and means that the two parties and the business concerned become 
especially vulnerable.  
Such a situation suggests that the franchisee will withdraw from the pre-contractual 
negotiations free from ramifications if the conditions cease to be of interest in light of the 
information provided by the franchisor. Legal systems recognise this possibility, as in the 
eyes of the law, the parties have yet to reach an irreversible point in the negotiations; in 
other words, the contract remains unsigned.  
The franchisor’s position is different at this point, however, insofar as he or she is obliged 
to act with diligence in the handing of the pre-contractual information document. The 
franchisor must provide this information to the franchisee efficiently, within the 
established timescale, while providing genuine details about the franchise. Otherwise, the 
lack of diligence in the pre-contracting stage may result in a breakdown in negotiations, 
refusal to sign the contract, and may even result in damages being sought by the 
franchisee, or even some more drastic consequences, after the franchise contract has been 
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signed. Consequently, failure to comply with the duty of pre-contractual disclosure is 
regarded as a conditio sine qua non for the fundamental validity of the contract. The 
franchisee can request annulment of the contract and/or compensation for damages for 
breach of duty on the part of the franchisor.  
Recent years have witnessed the consolidation of the duty of pre-contractual disclosure, 
which attempts to strengthen the, in principle, weaker legal position of the franchisee. 
The general legal trends relating to franchise contracts within the European Framework 
reflect this idea (Bueno Díaz, 2010), as exemplified by UNIDROIT’s Modal Law on 
franchises of 25 September 2002, which has been adopted in several countries, and has 
directly inspired several national laws protecting the franchisee and enforcing the duty of 
pre-contractual disclosure. In relatively recent times, reforms in legislation in a number of 
legal systems have come into force. Examples of these are China in 2004, Italy, Belgium, 
Mexico and Canada in 2005, Vietnam and Sweden in 2006, and the United States in 
2007. As discussed later, however, Spanish legislation is out of step with this trend.  
The Spanish case 
Recently, Spanish legislators have drawn up a law that sets out the regulations governing 
franchise contracts in which the franchise’s main sector consists of services (45%), 
followed by retail (43%) and hospitality (12%) (Tormo & Asociados, 2012). This law 
(Royal Decree Law 201/2010 of 26 February) governs commercial activity in franchises 
and the communication of data to the franchising registry (BOE, 13th March 2010), 
which transposes the European Community regulation (2006/123/EC, of 12 December 
2006, relating to services in the domestic market) in the area of contractual principles 
(Rutgers, 2009). 
Despite the significant changes contained in this new law, it adds nothing to the concept 
of the duty of pre-contractual disclosure of the franchisor to the franchisee. In fact, the 
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situation remains just as it was prior to the Royal Decree-Law 2485/1998, even after 
Royal Decree-Law 419/2006. This regulation focuses on the content of the duty of pre-
contractual disclosure, and, along with French legislation, has turned out to be “inspiring” 
a certain degree of unification (e.g., the Draft Common Frame of Reference, or DCFR) in 
matters relating to European Contract law (Collins, 2008).  
Thus, the franchisor’s duty of pre-contractual disclosure is unchanged and remains an 
element apt for assessment to evaluate the chances of success in integration in the 
franchise network. The Spanish Organic Law of Regulation of Retail Trading establishes 
the franchisor’s obligation to provide the future franchisee with a written document 
containing information that is true and not misleading before signing the franchise 
contract or pre-contract. The franchisor must make this document available to the 
franchisee a minimum of 20 working days before signing the franchise contract or pre-
contract, and before the franchisee is obliged to make any payments.  
This true and not misleading information must, at the bare minimum, include details to 
identify the franchisor (including all registered business activity), legal accreditation of 
the brand name and logos pertaining to the franchise, the nature and length of the 
contract, and, where applicable, the legal status in terms of industrial propriety. It should 
also contain a description of the franchise’s sector of activity as well as the firm’s 
experience, characteristics of its content, and exploitation. The latter includes 
characteristics related to know-how, commercial or technical assistance offered by the 
franchisor, an estimation of investment and costs for getting the business up and running, 
and market studies with a forecast of business or exploitation results. Moreover, it 
provides information on the structure and extent of the network in Spain, on the 
network’s organisational model, the number of establishments, the geographical 
distribution of these establishments, and the number of establishments that have ceased 
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their activity along with the causes of closure. Finally, the franchisor must provide only 
essential elements of the franchise contract; that is to say, rights and obligations of the 
parties involved, length of contract, cause of termination and renewal of the contract, 
economic conditions, exclusivity agreements, and limits to the availability of the 
franchisee’s business.  
Clearly, the lack of sanctions for breaching the duty of disclosure leads to a need for 
transparency in the market, which demands that the franchisee approaches an existing 
business which he or she joins ex novo. Despite this, the complexity of the franchise 
contract implies that the pre-contractual information provided to the franchisee is seen as 
a determining factor in settling the contractual agreement. This is the result of data 
relating, for example, to initial investment or the forecast of profits being provided by the 
franchisor and being agreed to by the franchisee (Díez Picazo, 2007).     
Hence, given the importance of this issue, there should be a system of sanctions in place 
in cases where franchises fail to provide the mandatory information, such that if the 
franchisor does not comply with this duty it could be regarded as a breach of the 
agreement and could affect the validity of the franchise contract. In short, legal 
assessment of the duty of contractual disclosure should go much further than the need for 
transparency, and should also provide legal cover in questions related to the capacity to 
annul the contract (Martí Miravalls, 2010).  
Surprisingly, in light of the above and following important legal quantitative and 
qualitative reforms subsequent to the impact of the UNIDROIT Model Law of 2002 in 
other countries, the pertinent legislation has remained the same since 1998. Indeed, the 
current Spanish system has two basic shortcomings. The first is a lack of adaptation to a 
shift in focus on this issue (transparency versus franchisee protection). As a result, under 
the duty of pre-contractual disclosure the franchisee’s unquestionable rights to receive 
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pre-contractual information goes unresolved. Moreover, the legislation does not oblige 
the franchisor to declare a situation of insolvency during the time prior to the possible 
signing of the franchise contract. The second, and perhaps more significant, deficiency 
lies in the surprising fact that the Spanish law lacks a system of sanctions for breaching 
the duty of pre-contractual disclosure. In other words, the legislation ignores the 
consequences of the breach—which, as discussed above, may affect contract validity—
and its conditions—the deadlines and the duration—for effecting the corresponding legal 
action for failure to comply with the duty of pre-contractual disclosure. This situation is 
unjustifiable from the practical perspective, given its enormous repercussions for 
jurisprudence, so much so, in fact, that a sizeable number of legal decisions concerning 
franchise contracts are affecting contractual validity due to breaches of contract due to 
failures to comply with the duty of pre-contractual disclosure (e.g., Judgment of the 
Provincial Court of Barcelona, 21 May 2009, Judgment of the Provincial Court of 
Madrid, 30 December 2009, and Judgment of the Provincial Court of A Coruña, 6 March 
2009). The effect of elements from abroad should be taken into account in franchises that 
operate in Spain and whose origins lie in foreign markets. 
The UNIDROIT Model Law on franchising. 
The work of UNIDROIT in the area of franchise contracts and franchise networks has 
led, among other things, to the UNIDROIT Model Law of 25 September 2002. This 
Model Law has been adapted to regulate franchise contracting in several countries such 
as Belgium, the United States, Italy, and China. The objective of this Model Law consists 
of offering the national legislators an inspiring framework, and the consultation tools for 
developing country-specific franchising legislation (Peters, 2007).  
This Model Law contains ten articles devoted to practical application, definitions 
pertaining to the hand-over of the pre-contractual disclosure documents, its qualifications, 
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updates and formal requirements, situations where the franchisor is exempt from this 
duty, the contents of the information, the acknowledgement of receipt by the potential 
franchisee, the consequences of breach of contract, the timescale, and the unquestionable 
nature of the right to pre-contractual disclosure. This analysis should, however, be 
focused on two key aspects, which should be included in future legislative reforms: 
conditions where franchises are exempt from the duty of contractual disclosure (article 5) 
and the system governing a breach of the duty of pre-contractual disclosure (article 8).  
The first of these refers to exoneration from the duty of disclosure that constitutes a 
necessary pre-condition for market transparency and competency in the search for the 
aforementioned balance in information asymmetry. Consequently, article 5 of the Model 
Law specifically states that the provision of a document to the potential franchisee is not 
required when there is a pre-existing subjective or objective link that casuistically 
develops this precept. Several situations exist in which the franchisor is exempt from the 
duty of disclosure. Primarily, this exemption comes into force when the possible 
franchisee has been a manager or administrator of the franchisor or of an affiliated 
company for at least the year prior to signing the contract. Second, when there is an 
allocation or transfer of the rights and obligations of a franchisee and an existing 
franchise contract when the allocation or transfer is linked under the same terms and the 
franchisor has not intervened significantly in the transaction but has simply approved it. 
Third, when granting a franchise to sell goods or services to a possible contracted 
franchisee in an identical or similar business for the two previous years if franchise sales, 
according to forecasts, do not exceed twenty per cent of the total volume of sales of the 
franchisee and its affiliated firms putted together. Fourth, nor is it necessary to provide 
pre-contractual documentation when the potential franchisee commits, by contract, to 
contribute financially an amount that exceeds a pre-established sum. Equally, when the 
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net financial worth, together with that of affiliated companies or the total turnover, comes 
to more than a particular amount. Finally, the franchisor is exempt from the duty of pre-
contractual disclosure when a franchise is renewed or extended under the same 
conditions. 
Thus, the UNIDROIT model of exemption is based upon the balance between the two 
sides of the franchise contract. We should bear in mind that the principle behind the duty 
of pre-contractual disclosure is aimed at compensating the imbalance between the 
franchisor and the potential franchisee. The balance considers two aspects: the 
informative and the economic. With regard to the former, it is undoubtedly unnecessary 
to provide information when the potential franchisee knows the business well due to the 
existence of a previous, subjective link, or because there is an element of continuity under 
the same conditions, thus breaking the information asymmetry. The other aspect refers to 
balancing economic forces. In this respect, there is no obligation to inform the franchisee 
when an economic imbalance does not exist between the two parties either due to the 
amount involved in the operation or the net financial worth of the two sides. This is 
justified because, under such circumstances, the leader of the franchise network does not 
have a predominating economic situation.   
The second key aspect in this subject refers to a breach of pre-contractual disclosure on 
the part of the franchisor for reasons of delay, error, or omission in handing over the 
documentation. Article 8 states that delay in the hand-over, error or omission in the 
written documents, or any substantial modification of this information allows the 
franchisee to terminate the contract and even to request compensation for damages.  
In practice, the franchisor may well hand over the information after the deadline, or, 
although the documentation is handed over on time, it may include essential information 
that could lead to errors. Equally, information provided on time might omit some key 
 11 
aspects. Under these circumstances, the franchisee could terminate the contract and 
demand compensation thirty days after notifying the franchisor of this situation in 
writing. The most common interpretation in law and in jurisprudence of contract 
termination is in the form of contract cancellation (through an invalidating error in the 
agreement), as opposed to other legal options such as avoidance or termination of the 
contract (Díez Picazo, 2007). 
The franchisee is sometimes unable to terminate contracts or cases, however. Franchisees 
are unable to do so if they have been able to obtain the correct required information by 
other means, or the franchisor has not committed an error. Likewise, the franchisee 
cannot terminate the contract when, according to the particular circumstances of the case, 
there is a disproportionate consequence. Clearly, in these first two exceptions, burden of 
proof lies with the franchisor, whilst in third instance, although the franchisor may 
attempt to provide evidence that will avoid contract termination, it is regarded as an 
exemption that must be assessed by the judge ex casu.  
Although this legislation seeks to protect the franchisee as the weaker side of the contract, 
the Modal Law attempts to avoid undue use as an abusive legal strategy. Indeed, one of 
the dangers of the power of annulment of franchise contracts is that it can be used as a 
legal weapon in defending the franchisee against the franchisor; for example, when the 
latter takes the franchisee to court over breach of contract. In order to avoid such a 
situation, article 8.2 of the Model Law establishes that, for the annulment to take effect, a 
year must pass between registration for the request and the moment it is legally annulled. 
The calculation of the necessary time for cases of delay in handing over information is 
thirty days before the documentation should have been handed in. For cases of error or 
omission, the period would be calculated from the day the document is handed in.  
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With regard to compensation for damages that can accompany the annulment of a 
contract, damages cannot be requested once a year has passed from the moment the 
franchisee is aware of the events that justify court action. Furthermore, under no 
circumstances will the franchisee be able to claim three years after the date of the breach 
of duty of pre-contractual disclosure on the part of the franchisor. Consequently, the 
franchisee cannot wait more than a year to present a lawsuit and the franchisor knows that 
no action whatsoever can be taken once three years have passed. Again, this is an attempt 
to balance contractual relations between franchisor and franchisee, which, in short, 
appears to be the objective of the Model Law. Clearly, despite the existence of regulation 
in Spain as to the content of duty of disclosure, the UNIDROIT Model Law still offers a 
much more complete set of regulations. This is because the Model Law covers 
exemptions of the duty to disclose information when the franchisee has been a director or 
affiliate of the franchise, as well as considering the resources at the franchisee’s disposal 
when the franchisor fails to comply with the rules of disclosure of information, and the 
franchisee’s inalienability of the rights granted by the Model Law, a fact that Spanish 
legislators should take on board.  
Conclusions 
Today, the consolidation in international trade of market elements such as franchise 
contracts is a reality. The proliferation of franchise contracts and franchise networks has 
brought about the development of regulations to protect the contractual party with a 
weaker legal position. Consequently, regulation concerning the timely and adequate pre-
contractual disclosure duty is obligatory in the Draft Common Framework for Reference 
(DCFR), specifically in franchise contracts. Moreover, it considers compensation action 
for breach of duty for the franchisee (art. IV-4:102 To I DCFR) (Rutgers, 2009). 
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Unsurprisingly, in the area of international commerce, there is special interest in the 
search for a legal balance between the different legal statuses: franchise, agency, 
concession, and distribution. We are thus bearing witness to necessary protective 
regulation for the market to function correctly. Evidently, a clearly imbalanced legal 
relationship is harmful to the sustainable development of commercial relations, hinders 
economic development, and engenders conflict and lawsuits.  
This is the case of franchisee protection in the area of pre-contractual negotiations, and, 
in particular, the consolidation of the duty of disclosing pre-contractual information on 
the part of the franchisor. An obligation that is established today, before the contract is 
signed, may become effective tomorrow once the contract is signed, as a cause for the 
annulment of the contract and the payment of damages. This serves as protection that 
strengthens the legal position of the franchisee with regard to the franchisor, and that 
balances legal business within the franchise and its networks. Although the legislation 
seeks to strike a balance between the two parties, and thus attempts to avoid the 
franchisee’s rights to receive pre-contractual information, it opens the door for improper 
use of the legal protection it affords in the face of justifiable claims from the franchisor.  
Notes 
 UNIDROIT’s member States are spread across all five continents and represent a variety 
of different legal, economic, and political systems, as well as different cultural 
backgrounds. Current member states are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Holy See, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, 
Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Serbia, Romania, Russian 
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Federation, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
United States of America, Uruguay and Venezuela.  
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